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Abstract
When people look online for information about humanitarian crises, they increasingly encounter media content
that blurs the line between reality and fiction. This includes everything from rumour and exaggeration to partisan
journalism and completely invented stories designed to look like real news (so-called ‘fake news’). This article
shows that disinformation is causing real and serious harm to those affected by humanitarian emergencies; it can
undermine the ability of humanitarian workers to provide relief; and it has exacerbated conflict and violence.
Disinformation is also making it harder for journalists to report on the humanitarian sector, and hold the powerful
to account, because it undermines audience trust in information more generally. The article concludes by
considering interventions that could address the challenges of disinformation. It argues for more support of
quality journalism about humanitarian crises, as well as media literacy training. Finally, it is crucial that aid
agencies and news outlets commit to accuracy and fact checking in their reporting and campaigning.
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In 2014, a campaign group posted a video on YouTube
called ‘Syrian hero boy’. The clip showed a young boy
dramatically running through gunfire to save a girl, and
it quickly went viral. The video was viewed more than
five million times and republished on the websites of
mainstream news outlets around the world, including
the Daily Telegraph, Independent, Daily Mail and New
York Post. It was also shared by the organisation Syria
Campaign, which attached a petition calling on world
leaders to stop the conflict.
There was just one problem: the video wasn’t real. It
was the creation of 34-year-old director Lars Klevberg,
and it was filmed in Malta with child actors, using a set
from the movie Gladiator. Klevberg said he wanted the
video to start a conversation about the impact of war on
children. Critics said he had gone too far: that the video
created confusion and cynicism, which undermined
attempts to address conflict in Syria (Salyer, 2014).
‘Syrian hero boy’ was not an isolated incident. When
audiences look online for information about humani-
tarian crises, they increasingly encounter media content
that blurs the line between reality and fiction. This
includes everything from rumours and exaggerations on
social media, through to partisan journalism, satire and
completely invented stories that are designed to look like
real news articles. Although this media content varies
enormously, it is often grouped together under nebulous
and all-encompassing terms such as ‘fake news’, ‘disin-
formation’ or ‘post-truth’ media.
Scholars have started to pay serious attention to the
production and impact of all these forms of disinforma-
tion. But they have not yet closely examined their impact
in humanitarian crises. This is a remarkable oversight. In
humanitarian crises, false information can have life-and-
death consequences. As Jeanne Bourgault, President and
Chief Executive Officer of Internews, states, false infor-
mation can ‘undercut efforts to improve health, make
disasters worse than they already are, alienate vulnerable
populations, and even incite violence’ (quoted in Igoe,
2017).
This article introduces the emerging research about
online disinformation and the many forms it can take. It
then considers the impact of this disinformation on
humanitarian crises, identifying a number of cases where
it has caused real harm for those affected by disaster.
Even more troubling, perhaps, is the impact it may have
on audiences in the long term and their willingness to
trust the news media when it provides important
information or holds those with power to account.
The article finishes by examining the groups that are
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producing disinformation about humanitarian crisis and
asking what can be done.
F*** News and Disinformation
In 2017, Collins Dictionary declared ‘fake news’ its word
of the year. But most media scholars would prefer the
termwas removed from the English lexicon, as it is vague
and can be deployed to advance a political agenda.
Donald Trump famously uses the phrase ‘fake news’ to
refer to a wide range of media content that he doesn’t
like. And audiences take a similarly broad approach; in
focus groups, Nielsen and Graves (2017) find that
audiences define ‘fake news’ to include partisan
journalism, propaganda and advertising as well as
invented stories that masquerade as news reports.
Attempting to add clarity to the debate, journalism
commentator and researcher ClaireWardle (2017) suggests
that we should distinguish between different types of fake
news, paying attention to: 1) the nature and type of the
content, 2) the motivation of the producer and 3) how it is
disseminated. From this analysis,Wardle suggests there is a
spectrum of fake news: at one end is satire and parody –
content that has no intention to cause harm but can
potentially fool audiences; in the middle there is content
that is taken out of context ormanipulated; and at the other
end is news content that is 100 per cent false and is designed
to deceive (see also Tandoc et al., 2018).
None of these different types of fake news are new.
The news media have long published exaggerations,
false information, propaganda and conspiracy theories,
presenting them as truth. In the 1830s, for example,
New York Post published a series of articles claiming
that life had been found on the moon (Tworek and
Hamilton, 2018). Staged and fabricated content was
also common during the American-Spanish war, and it
continued through the ‘penny press’ era in the US,
where duelling editors sought to grow their readership
with fantastical and scandalous accounts of events
(Tucher, 1994).
Although it is not new, two factors are making the
challenges of disinformation far more acute today. The
first is technology. The internet has led to an explosion of
all information sources – both truthful and false – and
the sheer quantity of sources makes it increasingly
difficult to delineate the two. When the celebrated
British philosopher Onora O’Neill gave the 2002 Reith
lectures, she predicted these challenges to come:
It is quite clear that the very technologies that spread
information so easily and efficiently are every bit as
good at spreading misinformation and disinforma-
tion… [people] may not heed available evidence and
can mount loud and assertive campaigns for or
against one or another position whether the available
evidence goes for or against their views.
(O’Neill, 2002)
It is now very cheap and easy for anyone to spread
falsehoods – for a motivated individual to create a website
that looks like it is a traditional news outlet or tomake a false
claim on social media and watch it go viral. The extent of
this issue was confirmed in a recent, massive study of online
information flows published in Science, which analysed the
spread of approximately 126,000 ideas across millions of
tweets. This analysis found that ‘falsehood diffused signifi-
cantly farther, faster, deeper andmore broadly than truth in
all categories of information’ (Vosoughi et al., 2018: 1146).
Other studies have shown that the most ‘successful’
fabricated stories can attract more likes and retweets than
the most popular and accurate stories published in the
mainstream media (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017).
These findings cut to the heart of some of our most
celebrated ideals about free speech and democracy. For
centuries, liberal philosophers have argued that open debate
and discussion will edge us closer to the truth. As John
Milton proclaimed in 1644, ‘Let [truth] and Falsehood
grapple; whoever knewTruth put to the worse, in a free and
open encounter?’ Two centuries later, John Stuart Mill,
perhaps the most famous advocate of free speech, made a
similar argument. He suggested that if we can only stand up
and freely challenge false ideas then we will see ‘the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error’ (1859: 33). This central tenet is called
into question by the chaos of online misinformation,
channelled and amplified through social media.
A second phenomenon has made the challenge of
disinformation more acute today: the behaviour of political
elites. More specifically, the willingness of leaders, even
those in supposedly liberal democratic states, such as the
US, UK and Italy, to lie to the public or disregard evidence.
Donald Trump is, of course, the most famous example of
this phenomenon. According to the Washington Post fact
checkers, in his first 600 days in office, President Trump
made 5,001 false or misleading claims (Washington Post,
2018). This disregard for facts is said to have contributed to
a wider ‘post-truth’ political landscape in the US – that is, a
culture in which empirical evidence plays a vastly reduced
role (McIntyre, 2018). In addition, Trump’s attacks on the
newsmedia have created additional confusion about which
information sources can be trusted (Mourão et al., 2018),
and this allows disinformation and falsehoods to flourish.
Disinformation and Humanitarian
Crises
There have not been any systematic studies of the
quantity or reach of disinformation about humanitarian50
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issues. But there are many anecdotal examples that have
been documented – and there is reason to think that the
phenomenon is causing real and extensive harm.
During the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa,
websites masquerading as news outlets published false
stories about the causes and cures of the disease. In
Nigeria, two people died and twenty were hospitalised
after drinking excessive quantities of salt water, which
they readwould protect them from the disease (Neporent,
2014). In the US, multiple websites published false news
stories that contained alarmist accounts, one claiming
that an entire town in Texas was being quarantined after a
family tested positive for the virus. The story was shared
more than 300,000 times (Dzieza, 2014) and may
have contributed to the wider landscape of panic and
xenophobia surrounding the epidemic.
Online disinformation has also exacerbated conflict.
In South Sudan, the UN reports that social media ‘has
been used by partisans on all sides, including some senior
government officials, to exaggerate incidents, spread
falsehoods and veiled threats, or post outright messages
of incitement’ (UN Security Council, 2016: 10). In one
instance, a false news story, published on the website
SouthSudanNation.com, stated that a general was
planning to ‘massacre Equatorians’. The story spread
through WhatsApp, YouTube and Facebook as well as
offline networks, and was used ‘to mobilize others to take
up arms to counter the “attack”’ (Reeves, 2017; see also
Lynch, 2017).
Finally, false news has made it more difficult for relief
organisations to operate. Organisations working with
migrants in the Mediterranean, for example, have been
targeted in fake-news attacks (Magee, 2018). Sean Ryan,
Director of Media at Save the Children, describes his
organisation’s experience:
In the Mediterranean our search and rescue opera-
tions have been falsely accused of colluding with
traffickers. It started as a report in the Italian media
and then Defend Europe, the far-right group, hired
their own boat to try and stop what we were doing.
Breitbart released a video which purported to prove
our collusion with traffickers but showed nothing of
the kind. We had to fight this propaganda without
many resources…
(cited in ibid.: 8)
These allegations suck up valuable resources, not least by
requiring public-relations and legal responses. More
importantly, they can feed into and foster an anti-
migrant climate and increase mistrust towards NGOs
and their interventions.
In addition to these short-term consequences, disin-
formation may have a profound long-term impact by
undermining the trust that citizens place in all sources of
information. Research shows that audiences are con-
fused and concerned about disinformation, and they
struggle to know which sources of news to trust. A 2018
Pew Centre study found that 42 per cent of Americans
believe the news media ‘fabricate stories frequently’
(Guess et al., 2018). And America is not exceptional.
The Reuters Digital News Report 2018, which surveyed
more than 70,000 people around the world, found that
over half (54 per cent) of respondents were concerned
about their ability to distinguish real and fake
information on the internet. Similarly, the 2018
Edelman Trust Barometer, which surveyed more than
30,000 people in 28 countries, found a remarkable 59 per
cent support the phrase ‘I am not sure what is true and
what is not’ (Edelman, 2018).
Among other issues, this lack of trust makes it much
harder for journalists to do their job – to provide
information about humanitarian issues and to hold
those with power to account. The news media has
historically played an important (albeit imperfect) role in
supporting the response to humanitarian emergencies:
by providing surveillance and early warning, raising
awareness and monitoring the treatment of citizens
(Cottle and Cooper, 2015: 4). If audiences do not trust
the news media to provide reliable information, it can no
longer perform these tasks.
Trust is also crucial in photojournalism, which has
historically played a special role in humanitarian journal-
ism and witnessing (Bunce et al., forthcoming). Early
foreign correspondents, working before the camera was
invented, argued that written text was unable to convey
the horrors they encountered reporting on humanitarian
crises (Curtis, 2015: 29). Photography helped to
overcome this barrier: what Scarry has called ‘pain’s
inexpressibility’ and resistance to ‘verbal objectification’
(1987). During a devastating famine in India in 1876–8, a
British military official took a series of photographs
depicting extremely emaciated men, women and
children, and these had a profound impact on the way
British elites and audiences mobilised and responded to
the famine (Twomey, 2015). Twomey argues that this
crisis introduced the practice of displaying shocking
images as ‘evidence’ of bodily suffering and deprivation
that might prompt humanitarian action (ibid.: 52).
For a photo or video footage to ‘work’, however, the
audience must trust its creator. As Roland Barthes
argued, the reality of photographs, and their guarantee
of authenticity, does not rest in the photographs
themselves: ‘it is lent by editors and later by viewers
who accept the claims made by texts that they are proof
of “what-has-been”’ (Barthes, 1977: 44). The proposed
contract between an event and its truthful representation
was hard enough to sustain in the era of traditional,
chemical photography, but it has become more difficult
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in the era of digital photography, in which editing and
manipulation of photos is widespread, cheap and easy
(Taylor, 2000: 132). In fact, it is strained to breaking
point now photographs are frequently disembodied from
their producer and sent into the world without any detail
of their provenance.
Alarmingly, the technology that enables multimedia
deception improves every day. Engineers and program-
mers have created software that can mimic voice exactly;
and they are on the cusp of creating fake videos from
scratch that are indistinguishable from real footage. One
writer in Atlantic Magazine has gone as far as arguing
that ‘manipulated video will ultimately destroy faith in
our strongest remaining tether to the idea of a common
reality’ (Foer, 2018).
Who Is Making Disinformation about
Humanitarian Crises?
The creators of disinformation aremotivated bymultiple
factors. Some seek financial gain, such as the teenagers in
Macedonia who famously produced false news stories in
the lead up to the 2016 US election (Silverman &
Alexander, 2016). In humanitarian crises, however, the
more common driver of disinformation creation appears
to be partisanship and political influence. Humanitarian
emergencies are often heavily politicised and multiple
stakeholders seek to influence their representation in the
news media and elsewhere online. Some of these groups
are willing to spend considerable resources to create
fabricated websites and social media content: a
continuation of long traditions of propaganda.
Russian President Vladimir Putin oversees extensive,
precise, disruptive fake-information campaigns that are
designed to cause confusion (Paul &Matthews, 2016). At
Russia’s ‘Internet Research Agency’, hundreds of
employees write content for false blogs and social
media accounts. These are then mobilised to create
disinformation campaigns about issues ranging from the
conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine to an invented
explosion at a chemical plant in Centerville, Louisiana
(Chen, 2015). MIT media researcher Ethan Zuckerman
calls this content ‘disinformatyza’: ‘news that’s not trying
to persuade you … it’s trying to pollute the news
ecosystem, to make it difficult or impossible to trust
anything. … Disinformatyza helps reduce trust in
institutions of all sorts, leading people either to
disengage with politics as a whole or to put their trust
in strong leaders who promise to rise above the sound
and fury’ (2017).
In 2018, extensive disinformation campaigns were
traced back to Iran, too. More than 600 Facebook pages
and 300 Twitter accounts linked to the Iranian regime
were shut down for their involvement in a concerted
campaign (Gilbert, 2018). According to FireEye, the
security firm that discovered the campaign, these
accounts were a coordinated operation that leveraged
‘a network of inauthentic news sites and clusters of
associated accounts across multiple social media
platforms to promote political narratives in line with
Iranian interests’ (ibid., 2018), including of the Israel–
Palestine conflict, politics in North Korea and the UK’s
departure from the EU.
In Syria, there is a fervent propaganda war between the
Americans, Russians and Iranians, and between rebel
and regime groups. All are extremely active online. Pro-
regime Russian content producers have created websites
and attacked groups like the White Helmets, calling
them ‘terrorists’ and dismissing stories about children
killed by chemical attacks as fake news featuring ‘actors’
(Solon, 2017). In articles from all sides of the campaign,
there are links to official-looking reports and the
biographies of experts that seem trustworthy. It can be
very difficult to discern the provenance of information or
the agenda of a source (Hayden, 2018: 15).
NGOs are not passive bystanders in this (dis)infor-
mation landscape. They too engage in strategic infor-
mation campaigns and can mislead audiences with their
content. A prominent example in the 2000s was the Save
Darfur Coalition, which used inflated mortality statistics
to raise awareness of the conflict in Darfur. These
exaggerated claims were reproduced by many news
outlets in their reports of the conflict. The group also
took out full-page newspaper adverts alleging that
Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, had overseen the
killing of 400,000 citizens in Darfur – double the 200,000
deaths estimated by other experts (de Waal, 2007). The
adverts were ultimately ruled misleading by the British
Advertising Standards Authority; this was an
embarrassing outcome that played directly into the
hands of the Sudanese government and its allegations
that Western groups were exaggerating the scale of the
conflict (Mamdani, 2007).
In addition to their own campaign content, NGOs
consistently and actively seek to influence journalists and
their representations of crises. This has included exag-
geration of the scale of crises and the simplification – or
omission – of their root causes; it has also included
‘media stunts’ deigned to capture the media spotlight. In
her book Who’s Reporting Africa Now? (2018), Kate
Wright documents how NGOs create content and stage
events that can mislead journalists, resulting in
significant, and false, news coverage (see also Franks,
2008; Cottle and Nolan, 2007).
In an ideal world, journalists would fact-check and
verify all such claims before they published them. In
practice, however, news organisations are often too52
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rushed to do this, and even the most well-regarded and
trusted outlets reproduce NGO and publicity content.
Nick Davies documents this phenomenon in his book
Flat Earth News (2008), showing that vast quantities of
‘churnalism’ fill the pages of the UK press. Working
under intense resourcing pressures and required to
churn out tens of articles a day, journalists look online
for existing content – press releases, marketing material,
social media posts and previously published news articles
and newswire articles – and they frequently republish
this content with only slight amendments.
International news desks are under particularly
intense pressures. There have been deep cuts to the
number of foreign correspondents around the world
over the last twenty years (Sambrook, 2010). Today, the
vast majority of news outlets around the world do not
have foreign correspondents of their own. And if they do
include international news in their media packages, it is
by repurposing content produced by others (Scott et al.,
2018). The most common sources for this content are
international newswires, such as Thomson Reuters and
AFP. This is not necessarily problematic: newswires
place a very high premium on accuracy and verification
of sources. But news outlets may also rely heavily
on NGO content or material discovered on social
media – as was the case with ‘Syria hero boy’,
mentioned in the introduction. And this does raise the
likelihood that unverified or false information will be
further disseminated.
What Can Be Done?
Facebook, YouTube, Google, Twitter, WhatsApp and
other media platforms are all under increasing pressure
to prevent harmful disinformation from circulating on
their platforms. It is vital that these massive organisa-
tions start to tackle the problem. But there are also steps
that researchers, journalists and humanitarians can take.
The first priority is further research. Although fake
news has dominated public debate, conference program-
ming and presidential tweets for some time, we have
relatively little empirical data about its reach or impact. A
number of countries have decided to introduce new laws
without this evidence base to stifle what they define as
fake news. The Malaysian government, for example,
introduced legislation banning ‘news, information, data
and reports which is or are wholly or partly false’. India,
the UK and France are among other countries consider-
ing laws for misinformation. Paul Bernal, a legal
researcher argues that the ‘fake news crisis’ is a straw
man, an excuse for governments that have wanted to
shut down certain types of debate for some time: ‘the fake
news saga… provides an opening for them to do this. It’s
a Trojan horse’ (quoted in Priday, 2018).
The second priority is securing more stable funding
for humanitarian journalism. This includes, crucially,
trustworthy information reaching those communities
affected by disaster. Following the work of organisations
including the CDAC Network, Internews and BBC
Media Action, we know that this is a vital form of aid:
people need information as they need water, food,
medicine and shelter. Information can save lives, build
resilience, support livelihoods and empower (Hannides,
2015: 9). Information provision should be prioritised
within all humanitarian responses. In addition,
international journalism about humanitarian disasters
needs financial support. This content is incredibly
important but rarely profitable, and so it is neglected
by the commercial news market. This means it is vital
that citizens, foundations, philanthropists and public-
service outlets value and support this work (Scott et al.,
2018).
The third priority ismedia literacy.We need audiences
to know how to distinguish sources that are trustworthy
from those that are not. Education strategies will play a
crucial role in the global response to disinformation.
Legislators in California are currently considering a bill
that would embed more media literacy into the curricu-
lum as well as provide media-literacy training for
teachers (California News Publishers Association,
2018). Meanwhile, the European Commission’s High
Level Group for misinformation and fake news has
made a key recommendation that member countries
‘promote media and information literacy to counter
disinformation and help users navigate the digital media
environment’ (European Commission, 2018).
More broadly, we need to focus curricula on critical
thinking and reasoning. Recent interventions have
shown this can be massively beneficial to students’
ability to discern opinion and anecdote from scientific
evidence. In 2016, researchers ran a huge trial involving
10,000 schoolchildren in 120 primary schools in Kam-
pala, Uganda. The results, recently published in The
Lancet (Semakula et al., 2017), show that children who
were taught basic concepts about critical thinking vastly
outperformed the control group at a series of scenario-
based tests. They were more likely to reject arguments
based on anecdote and raise doubts about health cures
that had not been scientifically tested.
Finally, news outlets and NGOs need to commit to
accurate reporting and campaigning. There can be a
strong temptation for journalists and communication
teams to provide exaggerated or sensationalist accounts.
This content can come from a good place – it reflects a
utilitarian ethic in which the outcome (more funds/
awareness/action) is seen to justify the means (exagger-
ation or fabrication). But exaggerated content can create
serious, long-term damage that far outweighs these
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short-term gains. It can make it harder for humanitarian
groups to respond to crises; it can cause confusion that
leads audiences to ‘turn off’, not knowing who to trust;
and it can play directly into the hands of those who
would discredit journalists and activists.
It is not clear exactly how online technologies will
evolve and reshape humanitarian communications in the
future. But we know that, in our new information
ecology, trust is more vital than ever before. We must
support media institutions and citizens as they seek out
trustworthy sources.
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